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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The order granting Respondents' Motion for Review to the Utah 
Labor Commission Appeals Board is appealabli tah Coin I ot Appeals 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Appellants perfected the appeal by filing a 
Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals within thirty days of the 
Commission's Order. Exhibit 3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This case involves a dispute between the insurance carrier and the 
heirs of Edward Esquivel, who was killed in an industrial accident. A f i« hit t 
liability judgmt n( n :is >l>tainrtl in federal court, and the industrial insurance 
carrier seeks to offset the entire net judgment without paying any portion of the 
expenses of the action (attorneys' fees and costs), i r ;s>m 
1. 1 >i< i the Commission err when it failed to make the insurance 
carrier pay its fair share of the expense of obtaining a judgment against a third 
party tortfeasor, and allowing the carrier a 100% offset ag*unst tuturr benefits? 
a. JUIU. the Commission misinterpret Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-106(5) as providing the carrier a "first right of reimbursement and offset" 
which "takes precedence over flit" t/Ltniiaftt"". mint'si" mil is |\tul "first"? 
2. Does the proper formula for apportioning attorneys' fees and 
costs between the injured person and the insurance carrier require use of the n£l 
judgment as the economic iiitcicsi, ii hv appmuminl, siiuc (he rid judgment is 
the only interest in which the parties share a common claim? 
1 
3. If a third party tortfeasor pays a judgment, may the 
Commission discount the carrier's future payment obligations to present value, 
where the administrative rule reserves lump sum discounts for a "carrier" who pays 
"a weekly benefit" early, under "order" of the Commission? 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The appropriate standard of appellate review in this case is "correction 
of error." This case primarily involves the interpretation of a Utah statute, which 
is a legal question. Where the issue involves questions of law, a reviewing court 
will give no deference to an agency's determination since the appellate court has 
"the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform 
throughout the jurisdiction." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
An appellate court may grant relief if it determines that an agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law. Utah Code. Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
(1988). In so doing, the court applies a "correction-of-error" standard in its 
review of applicable statutory provisions. Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commn, 811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991). Under such circumstances, a reviewing 
court may grant relief only when an appellant has been substantially prejudiced 
by an agency's erroneous application or interpretation of the law. AUred v. State 
Retirement Board, 914P.2d 1172, 1174 (Utah App. 1996). Resolution of disputed 
issues is not benefitted by the Commission's expertise or experience. Bennett v. 
Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986). 
2 
Decisions construing provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act 
are subject to heightened scrutiny. Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 
182 (Utah 199 he Utah Supreme Court has specifically - "-it "to give 
effect to [purposes of t , uie Act should be liberally construed and applied 
to provide coverage" and that "any doubt respecting the right of compensation 
will be resolved in favor of the injured employee." State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are two possible applicable statutory sections, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-106(5) (1997 106(5)") and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-62(5) (1994) ("Section 62"). Section 106(5) was part of a recodification 
and revision of the worker's compensation laws at the time (lit t "(>m mission's 
Order was enh'M d.1 n )\\\\\u <w\\\w ntui the earlier Section 62 is the 
appropriate statute, because the parties' rights accrued thereunder. However, both 
statutes are virtually identical, so the outcome woul * the same regardless of 
which statute i- i I Stvfiitn !«~1,\ ] 06(5) is cited here, and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-62(5) (1994) is attached as Exhibit 4. 
SECTION 34A-2-106(5) 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be 
disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5)(a) through (c). 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' 
fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately against the 
1
 There is case law support holding that adjudicated law at the time the judgment was 
issued governs how the proceeds should be distributed. Prettyman v. Utah State Dept. of Finance, 
496P.2d89, 91 (Utah 1972). 
3 
parties as their interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to the 
employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the 
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the dependents, 
for any recovery had against the third party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be 
reimbursed, less the proportionate share of costs and attorneys' 
fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a). for the payments made 
as follows: 
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to the 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in 
the action against the third party if the combined 
percentage of fault attributed to persons immune from 
suit is determined to be less than 40% prior to any 
reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2); or 
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the 
percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer in the action against 
the third party if the combined percentage of fault 
attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to 
be 40% or more prior to any reallocation of fault under 
Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the 
employee's heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce or 
satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the 
person liable for compensation, (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Edward Esquivel sustained a fatal fall through a roof arising out of an 
industrial accident on April 26, 1993, at the Freeport Center in Clearfield, Utah. 
Esquivel sued the Freeport Center, settled the case, and arrived at a compromise 
with the CNA Insurance Company, the employer's worker's compensation carrier 
(hereafter, "CNA" or "the carrier"), to provide for a future reduction of benefits 
to satisfy CNA's lien on the settlement proceeds. Thereafter, Esquivel's heirs 
4 
(widow, four children and elderly, dependent * ! ;^ < \\ability 
action against Gravely, Iiic, the manufacturer of a sweeping machine that Edward 
was using at the time of his fatal accident. That case went to trial and resulted in 
a judgment in favor of the 1 leli s ii t tl te ai r 101 11 i;t of $203, SO ' 1 lit parties were 
unable to agree on how much of the substantial attorneys fees and costs should 
be "charged proportionally" to the carrier, as a credit against the carrier's right to 
offset future liability b\ \\w iiiuminl «>f thr tiff (iidimirtit. 
The heirs (appellants) filed an Application for Hearing to have an 
administrative law judge of the industrial commission determine the proper 
formula apportioning attorneys' fees am) a >o ,^ * 1 »< I \ 1« tipplii ai ion 1 <» 1 he facts of 
this case. The ALJ issued lengthy Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order on February 7, 1997. See Exhibit 2, Opinion of Judge Benjamin A. Sims. 
On March * , \^{h , ihr insurant r 1 .unci hit t'l a Mutnni tur Review. The Appeals 
Board of the Utah Labor Commission issued its decision denying the Motion for 
Review on January 14, 1998. See Exhibit 1 ...(>_ ihe Esquivels' Petitk for 
Review was timel) * u r : Exhibit 3. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 On April 26, 1993, Edward Esquivel ("Edward"), the husband 
andfather of Appellants (Esquncht ami son it I lent 1,1 w as, I illnll while working 
as a roofer for Redd Roofing, Iiic. ("Redd") at the Freeport Center in Layton, 
Utah. R. 1. Redd had assigned Edward to sweep old gravel from a warehouse 
roof, using a Gravely sweeper. 1 Vlnl< muiu-m u m^ I In* sweeper near the corner of 
5 
a raised roof monitor, the handle grip came off, causing Edward to fall about thirty 
feet, through the main roof, to his death. R. 2. 
2. Edward's heirs filed a wrongful death case against Gravely due 
to the defective condition of the handgrip assembly. R. 163. In March, 1996, the 
case was tried to a jury in federal court in Salt Lake City. The jury awarded total 
damages of $814,228, but found Redd 50% at fault, Edward himself 25% at fault, 
and Gravely 25% at fault. R. 165. Because of employer's immunity and Edward's 
fault, the verdict was reduced and judgment entered by Judge Tena Campbell on 
April 9, 1996 for $203,557. R. 27 and 165. 
3. CNA, Redd's carrier (R. 1.), began paying the statutorily-
required benefits to Edward's dependents in 1993. R. 161. In 1993, the heirs 
filed a claim against Freeport Center for a defective roof, which was settled in 
1994. The agreement liquidated CNA's lien to that point and reduced the benefit 
to $205 per week. R. 13. The Freeport settlement is only significant because it 
established the $205 weekly benefit which defines CNA's total "interest" for 
purposes of determining its proportional share of attorneys' fees and costs. 
4. Attorneys' fees in the Gravely case were $81,402.90, with out-
of-pocket costs of $53,596.38, for a total case "expense" of $134,999.28. R. 167. 
5. The parties disagreed as to whether CNA was entitled to any 
reimbursement and offset, after deducting CNA's proportionate share of attorneys' 
fees and costs, pursuant to § 34A-2-106(5)(a). As a result, on or about April 1, 
1996, CNA discontinued its weekly payments to dependents. To that point, CNA 
6 
had paid $21,3202 to Esquivel's dependents (after the Freeport case). The ALJ 
also found that the future value of payments owed was $126,602, for a total 
carrier "interest" of $147,922. R I 06. 
6. Esquivels filed an Application for Hearing in order to restore 
their weekly benefits and determine CNA's reimbursement and offset, if any, alt 11 
deducting CNA's proportionate sitare of attorneys' fees and costs. R. 106. 
7. The Honorable Benjamin A. Sims ruled after a hearing that 
CNA was responsible for 100% of the attorneys' fees and costs, and tl lerefore not 
entitled to any reinihui st iilent or oiibcu Exhibit 2; R. 167. The heirs would thus 
retain the entire net judgment of $68,507, with no future offsets. R 168. 
. 8. The Labor Commission's Appeals Board grant ed I !N A\ m< >l i< HI 
for review iyyo. See Exhibit 1. Although the Board held that 
CNA's proportionate share of fees and costs was 100% (R. 264), it made no 
assessment against CNA for this "expense" o* that 
CNA 1 priority first rig!it to reimbursement and offset which took precedence 
over any assessment of fees and costs to CNA. R. 265. The Board thus offset the 
heirs' entire net judgment against futi 1:1 e bei 1 e fi t s A dditionally, the Board gave 
the carrier yet m additional future offset of about $15,000 because it deemed 
Gravely's payment of the judgment as the equivalent of CNA paying a lump sum, 
entitling it to a discount to fncsi• 111 1 a 111 ^  I' '" 1" • I 
2
 CNA ultimately waived reimbursement of that sum in its Motion for Review. R. 176 
and 243. 
7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The fair share doctrine requires that the employer or his insurance 
carrier3 pay its fair share of the attorneys' fees and costs which were necessary to 
produce the third party judgment or settlement. The applicable statute provides 
that the carrier's share of attorneys' fees and costs be "charged proportionately 
against the parties as their interests may appear" and are a "credit" to the injured 
employee. § 34A-2-106(5)(a). Utah case law affirms that a carrier's proportionate 
share of attorney's fees and costs be determined first, and credited to the injured 
person as priority, before any reimbursement or offset to the carrier. 
The net judgment is the only money in which the carrier and injured 
person share a common economic "interest." Since neither the injured person nor 
the carrier have any "interest" in the attorneys' fees and costs paid to the attorney, 
the "net judgment," after deducting these fees and costs, becomes the basis for 
charging the parties "proportionately... as their interests may appear." Thus, the 
net judgment is the denominator in the mathematical formula to determine the 
parties' proportionate share of attorneys' fees. The "interest" of the carrier is the 
sum of past benefits paid plus future benefits owed, which is then divided by the 
net judgment to arrive at the carrier's proportionate share of fees and costs. When 
this formula is applied in this case, no reimbursement or offset is due the carrier. 
3
 Workers compensation law provides an identity of interest between the employer and 
the carrier. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2) (1997). This combined interest is referred to 
herein as that of "the carrier." 
8 
The formula for apportioning attorneys' fees and costs suggested by 
the appellants is firmly grounded in a fair reading of unequivocal statutory 
language and Supreme Court precedent, easy to understand and apply and fair to 
all parties. CNA's unprecedented proposal ignores important statutory language 
and is contrary to explicit Utah Supreme Court cases. If CNA's proposal were 
adopted, it would, in the future, result in gross oppression of injured workers and 
of widows and children of workers killed in job-related accidents. 
Lastly, the Commission erroneously applied lump sum rules to give 
the carrier a present value "discount rate," resulting in the offset of an additional 
$15,000 of future benefits. This action is contrary to law because the money 
came from a judgment, and not a "lump sum" paid "early" by the carrier, pursuant 
to "order" of the Commission. This imposes yet an additional unjustified burden 
upon the widow and children of the decedent which is not sanctioned by statute 
or case precedents. It would work a substantial and grave injustice on all future 




CNA Must Pay Its Fair Share 
THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
COMPEL THE INSURANCE CARRIER TO PAY ITS FAIR 
SHARE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS IN OBTAINING 
THE THIRD PARTY JUDGMENT, AS REQUIRED BY UTAH 
CODE ANN. §34A-2-106(5)(a). THE COMMISSION MIS-
INTERPRETED THE STATUTE AS GRANTING THE 
CARRIER A PRIORITY RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT. 
A. Introduction. 
The issue of apportionment of attorneys' fees and costs between the 
injured worker and the carrier has engendered considerable controversy and 
confusion over the years. The issue is of enormous importance to injured workers 
as well as insurance carriers. No Utah case has articulated a clearly-expressed 
formula, consistent with the statute, which can be easily and fairly applied in all 
future cases. The formula commonly used by practitioners and judges in this area, 
a one-third reduction in the lien, has absolutely no statutory basis, and results in 
windfalls to the carrier. CNA's suggested formula is worse, providing no 
apportionment of fees and costs whatsoever, with approximately a 122% offset of 
the net third-party judgment. 
The case sub judice clarifies this important but confusing area of the 
law. The statute is understandable and a fair formula can be fashioned which 
considers all statutory wording. The formula proposed herein is easy to 
understand and apply and is fair to all sides. It avoids the absurd unfairness of 
10 
situations where the applicant receives absolutely no benefit for the effort, cost 
and risk of bringing a personal injury suit against a third-party wrongdoer. 
B. The Fair Share Doctrine. 
Utah Supreme Court cases unanimously embrace the "fair share 
doctrine," interpreting the predecessors to § 34A-2-106(5) as mandating that the 
carrier pay its proportionate fair share of attorneys' fees and legal costs before it 
may enjoy any of the benefits stemming from a plaintiffs third-party lawsuit. 
Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1967). "In a 
substantial majority of states, when a third party suit is brought or recovery 
effected by the employee, the employer or carrier is now obliged to pay a portion 
of the attorney's fees out of his share." Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation § 74.32(a) at 14-138 (1995). 
The Utah Supreme Court has commented on the "fair share" 
philosophy inherent in the apportionment statute: 
Where each of the parties has the right to bring the action and one 
takes the initiative and obtains a recovery for the benefit of both, it 
is only fair that each hear his share of the expenses necessarily 
incurred in doing so. That this is the meaning intended in paragraph 
[(a)] seems unmistakably clear, (emphasis added) 
Worthen, 426 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1967). "Charged proportionately" in the 
statute means the carrier must necessarily pay its fair share of costs and fees for 
producing those benefits to which it lays claim. The Utah Supreme Court has 
condemned situations where a carrier has escaped such an apportionment: 
11 
Under the rulings made by the Industrial Commission in this case, 
the plaintiff by her efforts caused an undeserved windfall to the 
insurance carrier in that it was required to pay nothing whatsoever on 
its obligation to the plaintiff — not even a proportional share of the 
expenses incurred by the plaintiff for the carrier's benefit, (emphasis 
added) 
Graham v. Industrial Commission, 491 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah 1971). See also 
Prettyman v. Utah State Dept of Finance, 496 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 1972) (insurance 
carrier required to bear its pro rata share of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in 
obtaining settlement); and Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1973) 
(legislature has plainly stated that a proportionate share of attorneys' fees and 
costs must be deducted from insurer's share of the reimbursement). In Quinn v. 
State, 539 P.2d 761, 765 (Calif. 1975), the California Supreme Court held that 
"if the employer receives his fair share of the recovery, he must bear his fair share 
of the cost of the recovery." (emphasis added) Justice Tobriner eloquently 
expressed the injustice of failing to follow the fair share doctrine in these words: 
An active litigant has, by bringing and winning this lawsuit, created 
a fund upon which a nonparticipant in the litigation can draw in 
order to relieve himself of a legal obligation he would otherwise bear; 
the passive beneficiary thus necessarily benefits from plaintiffs efforts 
in bringing suit. The employer has contributed neither time, effort, 
nor money to the now-successful action; he thus seeks to enjoy the 
benefits of the suit without contributing to its costs, (emphasis added; 
footnotes omitted) 
Quinn, 539 P.2d at 765. The carrier is thus obliged under § 106(5) to pay its 
proportionate share of these expenses. Paying "nothing," as CNA did in this case, 
is not an option. 
12 
Defendants argued below that allowing plaintiffs a credit for 
defendants' proportionate share of costs and fees amounts to a "double recovery." 
R. 243. The Quinn court debunked the double recovery argument: 
To be sure, our interpretation will increase the plaintiffs present tort 
recovery and decrease the employer's recoupment of past benefits, 
but to characterize this result as an increase in compensation benefits 
is to ignore reality. The fact that the employer must pay some portion 
of his recoupment to the worker as a share of the attorney's fee does 
not make this payment additional workers' compensation: the 
employer's payment does not fulfill his obligation under the 
compensation statute; it recompenses the [claimant's] attorney for his 
services, (bracketed portion added) 
Id. at 769. Apportionment of fees and costs is not double recovery for the heirs, 
but simply insures that the carrier pay its fair share of the litigation expense. 
C. The Commission Misinterpreted § 34A-2-106(5) as Giving 
the Carrier's Interest a Priority Over Apportionment of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
The Appeals Board Order (Exhibit 1) erroneously holds that the 
carrier has a priority "first right of reimbursement" which "takes precedence over 
the claimant's interest." R. 264. It reads: 
In this regard, it is important to note that § 106(5)(b) and (c) grant 
the first right of reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier. 
Because the statute requires that the employer's interest in the third-
party award takes precedence over the claimants' interesty Redd 
Roofing's share must be determined/^. The dependents' share will 
then be limited to the amount of award that remains after Redd 
Roofing's share has been deducted, (emphasis added) 
Order Granting Motion for Review, R. 264. This is directly contrary to the 
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Worthen, where the court faced the 
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identical issue, based on a substantively identical statute. 426 P.2d at 223. 
Worthen condemned the Commission's piecemeal reading of the statute, which 
renders meaningless the part of the statute that says attorneys' fees are to be 
charged proportionately against the parties as their interests appear: 
The difficulty here confronted arises because if paragraphs (1) and (2) 
[the equivalent of the current § 34A-2-106(5)(a)and (b)] above are 
read separately and literally, each excluding consideration of the 
other, they are in conflict. If the directive of (1) is followed, that the 
expenses shall be charged against the parties as their interests appear, 
then the directive of paragraph (2), that the insurer paying the 
compensation "shall be reimbursed in full" cannot be complied with. 
Conversely, if the insurer is "reimbursed in full," then it is not 
charged its share of expenses as provided in paragraph (1). Where 
there is such conflict in the provisions of statutes it is improper to 
place all of the emphasis on either provision to the exclusion of the 
other. They should be considered together and it is proper to examine 
into the background and purpose as well as to the language of the 
statute to discover what the legislative intent was as to which should 
have priority, (emphasis added)4 
Worthen, 426 P.2d at 225. 
The Worthen court first addresses the underlying purpose of the 
statute as an aid in its interpretation. "The basic purpose of this statute is . . . 
making an equitable arrangement between an injured employee, and an insurer (or 
employer) who pays him workers compensation . . . . " (emphasis added) Id. The 
statute preserves a third-party action to the employee, but prevents double 
4
 It should be noted that the statute discussed in Worthen, denoted as Subsection (2), is 
the precursor of § 34A-2-106(5)(h). The original language of Subsection (2) in 1967 was later 
amended to add the even clearer language of the current Subsection (b) "reimbursed, less a 
proportionate share of costs and attorney's fees provided for in Subsection (5) (a)." (emphasis 
added) 
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recovery by requiring him to reimburse the insurer. Worthen then articulates 
Utah's version of the fair share doctrine: 
Where each of the parties has the right to bring the action and one 
takes the initiative and obtains a recovery for the benefit of both, it 
is only fair that each bear his share of the expenses necessarily 
incurred in doing so. That this is the meaning intended in paragraph 
(1) [currently § 34A-2-106(5)(a)] seems unmistakably clear. . . . It 
thus follows that Sec. (1), with unmistakable clarity[,] requires that 
the expenses and attorney's fees be charged proportionately against 
these "parties" (Worthen and the State Insurance Fund) as their 
"interests" appear. It is more reasonable to assume that the 
Legislature intended this application of the statute which comports 
with its equitable purpose than one which would bring about a 
contrary result, (emphasis and bracketed portions added; 
parentheticals in original) 
Id. at 225-26. Worthen then notes that "the sequence in which" the statute 
"undertakes an allocation of funds" should be regarded "as having some 
significance." (emphasis added) Id. The proper sequence involves determining 
the allocation of attorneys' fees and costs "first," as a "priority," and 
"reimbursement to the insurer is made from the funds remaining, and to the extent 
possible . . . ." Id. at 226. This priority payment of the attorneys' fee credit to 
the injured employee "before making the distribution of the funds" was upheld in 
Graham, 491 P.2d at 224 (citing Worthen). 
The Worthen court concluded that assigning a sequential priority to 
the proportional allocation of attorneys' fees before reimbursement of the carrier 
achieves "an equitable result in conformity with what we believe to be the overall 
intent of the statute. . . ." Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. This interpretation was 
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"more persuasive than the defendant's argument." Id. The carrier reimbursement 
part of the statute is not to be "taken literally... to the exclusion of the preceding 
paragraph which requires that the parties having an interest in the money 
recovered have their proportionate share of the costs and attorneys' fees deducted 
as provided in paragraph (1) before the remainder is allocated to them as provided 
in paragraphs (2) and (3)." Id. Worthen has been cited repeatedly by subsequent 
courts. See Graham, 491 P.2d at 224; Prettyman, 496 P.2d at 91; and Lanier, 508 
P.2d at 39. Accordingly, the Commission's finding that § 106(5)(b) and (c) 
"grant the first right of reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier" which 
"takes precedence over the claimant's interest" is clear error because it is contrary 
to Supreme Court precedents. 
The express language in the preface of § 106(5) specifically provides 
that third party recoveries "shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections 
(5)(a) through (c)." (emphasis added) Thus, the Commission erred by ignoring 
Subsection (a)'s mandatory requirement that attorneys' fees and costs "shall be 
. . . charged proportionately against the parties" as their interests may appear. 
"Against the parties" includes the carrier. Therefore, the allocation and reduction 
of the carrier's interest for attorneys' fees precedes reimbursement and offset by 
the carrier. Worthen, 426 P.2d at 225-6. 
D. The Commission Made No Allocation of Attorneys' Fees 
to the Insurance Carrier. Contrary to Statute and Case 
Precedents. 
The Commission's Order contains this arcane language: 
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Because Redd Roofing's interest in the award is more than the net 
amount of the award itself, Redd Roofing holds the entire interest in 
the award. Consequently, all attorney's fees and costs must be 
allocated to Redd Roofing, (emphasis added) 
Order, R. 264. Ironically, this holding is correct, but inexplicably no allocation of 
fees and costs is made to the carrier; they are all allocated against Esquivels: 
The Appeals Board hereby concludes that Redd Roofing may offset 
the sum of $68,507.97, which is the net amount recovered by the 
dependents of Mr. Esquivel in their lawsuit . . . , against Redd 
Roofing's future liability for workers' compensation benefits 
otherwise payable to the dependents. After the amount of 
$68.507.97 has been fully offset against such future benefits, Redd 
Roofing must then resume payment of the periodic survivors' benefits 
. . . . (emphasis added) 
Order, R. 265. Thus, the full amount of the net judgment is offset to benefit the 
carrier, with no attorneys' fees allocated to the employer, and no credit to the 
employee for that allocation of attorneys' fees. 
Under the Commission's decision, the carrier does not pay its "fair 
share" of the attorneys' fees and costs; the Esquivels pay not only the entire 
amount of the attorneys' fees and costs, but have their entire net judgment offset 
against future workers compensation benefits. The Esquivels get nothing! This 
is manifestly unjust and contrary to the letter and spirit of § 106(5). This 
decision must be reversed and a proper allocation made. 
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POINT II 
Determining Carrier's Share and Employee's Credit 
THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE REQUIRING THAT 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS BE "CHARGED 
PROPORTIONATELY AGAINST THE PARTIES AS THEIR 
INTERESTS MAY APPEAR" MEANS THAT EACH SIDE IS 
ASSESSED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AS THEIR 
INTERESTS RELATE TO THE NET TUDGMENT. THE 
EMPLOYER'S SHARE OF THE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
COSTS IS A "CREDIT" TO THE INJURED PERSON AND 
THUS REDUCES THE CARRIER'S REIMBURSEMENT AND 
RIGHT TO OFFSET FOR FUTURE OBLIGATIONS. 
A. The Statutory Sequence Requires Allocation and Charging 
of Attorneys' Fees and Costs First, as a Priority. 
A determination of how the proceeds of plaintiffs' judgment should 
be disbursed among the parties is not difficult. Section 34A-2-106(5) specifies the 
correct order. This "sequence" has "significance." Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. The 
three-step sequence for disbursement is: 
1. The attorneys'fees and costs are: 
A. Paid to the attorney. § 106(5)(a). 
B. Apportioned "against the parties as their interests may 
appear," with injured person getting a "credit" for the 
insurance carrier's share. § 106(5)(a). 
2. "Reimbursement" to the carrier for amounts paid. 
§ 106(5)(b). 
3. "Offset" of future benefits to the carrier (§ 106(5)(c)), after 
deducting employee's "credit." § 106(5)(a). 
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Worthen affirms that "the reasonable expense of the action, including 
attorney's fees,"5 is a "priority" and is paid first: 
If we do as the statute says and make the allocation provided for in 
paragraph (I) first, that is, charging the recovery with costs and 
attorney's fees in proportion to the interests of the parties, the 
disbursement stated first is made first, and has priority over the 
provision for the disbursement which follows it in paragraph (2) [the 
equivalent of § 34A-2-106(5)(b)]. Then the reimbursement to the 
insurer is made from the funds remaining, and to the extent possible 
after the first requirement for disbursement is complied with, 
(emphasis and bracketed portions added) 
Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. Giving a senior priority to payment of attorneys' fees 
and costs makes sense, since they cannot be apportioned, because only attorneys 
may rightfully have an interest in their fees and legal costs. The ALJ echoes this 
sentiment, stating "[an] attorney's interest in the judgment is in the fees and 
costs." R. 166. 
B. The Net Judgment Is the Basis for Charging the Carrier's 
Proportional Share of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
The words "charged proportionately" in § 106(5) (a) can only mean 
that the carrier and the applicant will each be required to pay a portion of these 
attorneys' fees and costs. "Proportion" means "the relation of one part. . . to the 
whole with respect to magnitude, quantity or degree . . . a portion or share of an 
actual or implied whole having a size or value relative to other portions or shares 
5
 The word "expense" clearly means out-of-pocket costs of the action, as well as 
attorneys' fees. Graham, 491 P.2d at 224. 
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. . . ." (emphasis added) Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1986, p. 1819. 
The Size of the "Pie." The statute clearly contemplates that the 
"whole," for purposes of determining the carrier's "interest," must be the net 
judgment (or settlement) because it is the only economic interest in which the 
parties have a common claim. The parties are not dividing up the attorneys' fees; 
they are dividing what remains after these fees are paid and that is the "net." 
Thus, neither attorney's fees nor the gross judgment can define our "whole," or 
"pie." What remains after the attorneys' fees and costs have been paid is the net 
judgment. 
Proper statutory interpretation, case precedent, logic and fundamental 
fairness all dictate that the net. judgment (or settlement) is the only basis for 
determining the parties' interests. We have already addressed the distribution 
sequence embodied in § 106(5) (a) which requires, as its first step, that "[t]he 
reasonable expense of the action, including attorney's fees, shall be paid . . . ." 
Thus, the attorneys' fees and costs are gone, or taken from the pie, first. They are 
not part of the "whole," which should be considered in step LB, i.e., determining 
the proportionate share of the attorneys' fees and costs to be assessed. Further, 
the word "and" appears right after the requirement that the attorneys' fees and 
costs "shall be paid." Only then, i.e., after the payment, do we find the 
requirement that they be "charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear." Thus, the proportional charge will be applied to the nel 
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judgment, because the attorneys' fees and costs have already been paid and are 
gone from the pie. Lastly, § 106(5)(c) provides that the "balance" is paid to the 
injured person to be offset against future carrier benefits. Using that term 
wouldn't make sense unless the statute first contemplates the payment of 
attorneys' fees and costs in Subsection (a) in order to arrive at the net judgment. 
Case Law Support. The allocation of attorneys' fees and costs is made 
first, as a priority, before any consideration of reimbursement or offset to the 
carrier. Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226; Graham, 491 P.2d at 224. The carrier will 
have to pay its share, but it can only pay it share from the net judgment because 
the fees and costs are already gone from the pie, as required by Worthen and 
Graham. The only two interests left to be considered in determining the 
proportion are those of the injured party and the carrier, and they can only have 
an interest in the net judgment, because that is all that is left after the attorneys' 
interest is paid. 
Logic. Simple logic dictates another reason why the net judgment 
must be used. Mathematically, you can't get a true "proportion" using the gross 
judgment, because the gross includes three interests (applicant, carrier and 
attorney), but only two interests (applicant and carrier) are being allocated. This 
simple example illustrates the logical inconsistency of using the gross judgment: 
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1/3 contingent attorneys' fee 
expenses of litigation (costs) 
net judgment 
carrier's lien 
Using the gross judgment, the carrier's proportionate share of attorneys' fees and 
costs would be: 
carrier's interest r$90.000>) = carrier's proportionate share = 27% 
gross judgment ($330,000) of fees and costs 
The applicant's interest would be calculated as follows: 
applicant's interest6 f$120.000) = applicant's proportionate share = 36% 
gross judgment ($330,000) of fees and costs 
The percentages of 27% and 36% don't equal a whole, and therefore it is not 
possible to follow the statutory language and assess the attorneys' fees and costs 
against the "parties" (only the carrier and applicant, under Worthen, 426 P.2d at 
226) "proportionately." 
Fairness. Using the gross judgment artificially kicks up the size of the 
denominator, resulting in a lower proportion for the carrier, based upon the fiction 
that the attorneys' fees and costs are part of the pie, when they are not. This 
would result in the carrier always getting a substantial, inequitable discount. 
Using the net judgment prevents this unfairness. 
6
 The applicant's interest is calculated by deducting the carrier's lien ($90,000) from the 
net judgment ($210,000), because the injured person can have no interest in the attorneys' fees 
or the carrier's interest. 
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C. Calculating the Parties' "Interest." 
Once the denominator, or "pie," is determined, the rest of the 
calculations are fairly simple. The statute, of course, recognizes that the attorneys' 
fees and expenses have already been paid by the injured party. The task now 
becomes deciding what proportion of those fees and expenses should be borne by 
the carrier, and then applying that sum "to be a credit upon any fee payable by 
the injured employee." § 106(5)(a). This credit must be applied against any 
reimbursement or offset that would otherwise accrue to the carrier; otherwise, the 
statutory language ("charged proportionately against the parties" and "credit") 
becomes meaningless. 
Illustration of Determining Interests. In Example No. 1 above, the 
denominator is determined by making the obvious deductions: 
$330,000 - gross settlement/judgment 
- $110,000 - 1/3 contingent attorneys'fees 
- $ 10 000 - expenses of litigation (costs) 
$210.000 - net judgment (the "denominator") 
The insurance carrier's "interest" is simply what the carrier has to pay, which 
results in this share or proportion of the net judgment: 
carrier's interest ($90r000^ = carrier's proportionate share = 43% 
net judgment ($210,000) 
The carrier's proportionate share of the fees and expenses, as its interest appears, 
is simply a mathematical calculation of its proportion times the fees and expenses: 
attorneys'fees and expenses = $120,000 
x carrier's proportional share x 43% 
carrier's proportional share of = $ 51.600 
attorneys' fees & expenses 
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The injured person's share of the net judgment must be determined 
by first deducting the carrier's lien, because the injured person can have no 
interest in that lien: 
net judgment ($210,000) — carrier's interest ($90,000) = 
injured person's interest ($120,000) 
The injured person's proportion is: 
injured person's interest $120.000 = injured person's = 57% 
net judgment $210,000 proportional share 
The injured person's proportionate share of attorneys' fees and costs is: 
Attorneys' fees and costs ($120,000) x injured person's proportional interest 
(57%) = injured person's share of attorneys' fees and costs = $68.400 
Pursuant to § 106(5)(a), the injured person is therefore entitled to a "credit" from 
the carrier in the amount of $51,600 toward the attorneys' fees and expenses 
owed, and the injured person thus pays the balance of $68,400. Assuming the 
attorneys' fees and expenses had already been paid to the attorney, the credit 
would, as a practical matter, come in the form of a reduction of the carrier's 
$90,000 lien in the amount of $51,600, leaving a net lien to the carrier of 
$38.400 to be paid out of the net judgment. 
Easy to Understand and Apply. It is evident that this formula is true 
to the statute and case precedents, easy to understand and apply, and fair to all 
parties. The formula follows the sequential outline of disbursements, precisely as 
prescribed by § 106(5)(a)-(c), by first paying the attorney his/her $120,000. The 
formula then determines the proportional shares of the carrier and injured party 
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against the only real and substantive economic interest that remains, the net 
judgment. The formula considers that the only true carrier's "interest" that 
"appears" is the lien of $90,000, because that is what the carrier actually paid out. 
The formula considers accurately and realistically the injured person's interest as 
the net judgment minus the carrier's lien ($120,000). The injured person can 
obviously have no more or less than this, because the injured party has no claim 
on the attorneys' fees and expenses, and no claim on the carrier's lien. 
As should be the case, these respective interests add up to a "whole," 
so that a true proportion can be determined. These proportional shares, expressed 
in terms of percentages, can easily be applied mathematically to the attorneys' fees 
and expenses to determine the dollar amount of each proportional share. It works 
in every conceivable situation. 
Fairness. The formula is fair to all sides. Assume for a moment that 
the underlying facts in Example No. 1 were that the case involved a serious injury 
(reflected by the $90,000 worker's compensation claim), and that the case 
actually went to trial with strong contentions being made against liability and the 
extent of damages. Assume also that expert witnesses (doctors and the like) were 
called to support the injured person's case. Almost all personal injury lawyers take 
cases on a contingent fee, but most also obligate the injured person to pay out-of-
pocket costs ("expenses of the action"). Litigation is very stressful, and the injured 
person (who may not even be back to work) has not only the stresses of his 
normal life and the injury, but also those resulting from the pressure of litigation 
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and trial. Let's suppose the trial takes five court days and the jury finally returns 
a verdict of $330,000. There has been an incredible effort and sacrifice by the 
injured person and his counsel to obtain this $330,000 verdict. The economic 
cost of producing this verdict has been $120,000. The injured person's efforts 
have brought a potential reimbursement to the carrier of $90,000, with absolutely 
no effort or risk. 
The carrier should pay a portion of the expense of the action. Yet, 
under the Order of the Appeals Board, the carrier would pay absolutely nothing! 
Under CNA's argument (R. 178), if the net judgment is sufficient to pay all or 
part of CNA's future interest, then CNA gets a total offset for that amount; and 
Esquivels pay all the attorneys' fees. 
The proposal made by the Esquivels in this case, however, pierces the 
illogical and anti-statutory unfairness of CNA's claims. It is requires that CNA 
pay a realistic amount of the costs of the action before it tastes the benefits 
thereof. It requires a fair share payment by CNA based upon a realistic 
assessment of the "pie" at stake, i.e., the net judgment/settlement, and not on 
some unrealistic fiction that involves percentages based upon money paid to 
somebody else (the attorney). 
Because the formula suggested by Esquivels is correct, firmly founded 
in proper statutory interpretation and relevant case law, and because it is fair, it 
should be adopted by is court. 
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D. Application of the Formula to the Facts of This Case. 
"Hard cases make bad law," goes the old adage. Maxfield v. Sainsbwy, 
172 P.2d 122, 131 (Utah 1946). Is the application of the formula in this case, 
which results in no offset for the carrier, a harsh result that will lead to future 
injustice? Or is it simply an aberration due to the unique facts of this case? It is 
the latter. A unique confluence of facts, including relatively high attorneys' fees 
and costs vis. the gross judgment, combined with the fact that this is a death case 
with very young children involved, which draws the benefits out for many years, 
produces an unusual, rare result. The carrier receives no offset, but this is just. 
No one challenged the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees and costs 
in this case, but a few comments are in order. The case engendered a very hard 
fight by the product-liability defendant who "pulled out all the stops." The 
Esquivels were required to retain two expensive, highly-trained, out-of-state 
experts who provided important engineering and safety testimony. The defense 
had multiple out-of-state experts and witnesses that were required to be deposed. 
There were hundreds of pages of documents and exhibits to review, and many 
liability depositions were taken. The attorneys contracted this case for a forty 
percent fee if it went to trial.7 R. 20-23. As a result, out-of-pocket costs were 
7
 This fee was negotiated originally by Richard IC Nebeker, now deceased, who took the 
case in. Sometime thereafter, he associated the firm of Sykes & Vilos for trial, but his original 
fee agreement governed, which provided for a one-third fee if the case settled and 40% if the case 
went to trial. Evidence was presented at the hearing that the attorneys had expended 
approximately $220,000 worth of time to that point, for which they were actually compensated 
just over $81,000. R. 22. 
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$53,596, and attorneys' fees were $81,402.90, for a total case "expense" of 
$134,999.28. The unusually high case expense reduces the net judgment, 
producing an unusually low "denominator" for purposes of the formula. It is 
obvious that this is aberrational in nature since most underlying cases are not so 
difficult, generally result in a one-third contingent fee, and aren't so expensive to 
litigate. 
Another unusual factor about this case is the fact that it is a death 
case involving four young children, a fairly young widow and a totally-dependent 
elderly mother. Accordingly, the benefits continue constant and undiminished 
until the youngest child (age 3 at the time of Edward's death) reaches age 18 in 
the year 2008. R. 158, R. 180. CNA was therefore looking at a future liability 
of $126,602. Fact No. 5. 
The net impact of these facts is that the carrier's interest ("the 
numerator") is going to be very high, much higher than the huge majority of run-
of-the-mill cases not involving a death under these circumstances. The carrier's 
interest will be 15 years of benefits from the date of the accident, compared 
against a very low denominator (net judgment). This rarity was not unanticipated 
by Worthen. In explaining the priority of "first" charging the carrier's fair share of 
attorneys' fees and costs, the Court noted the second step: 
Then the reimbursement to the insurer is made from the funds 
remaining, and to the extent possible after the first requirement for 
disbursement is complied with, (emphasis added) 
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Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. "[T]o the extent possible" is an acknowledgment that 
there will not be an insurer reimbursement in every case, because there may not 
be money left over after the priority "disbursement [to the injured person] is 
complied with." 
The application of the formula to our facts shows the following: 






• gross judgment 
• 40% contingent attorneys' fee 
• expenses of litigation (costs) 
• net judgment 
• carrier's lien ($21,320 past payment; 
and $ 126,602 future benefits) 
The carrier's proportionate share of attorneys' fees and costs is: 
carrier's interest $147.923 = carrier's proportionate share = 100% 
gross judgment $68,507 of fees and costs 
The ALJ found that the carrier "is essentially entitled to 100% of the available 
$68,507.25." R. 167. Since CNA has a claim for 100% of the net recovery, "it 
must pay 100% of the attorneys fees and costs." R. 167. The ALJ found that 
even though the above fraction would show a liability greater than 100%, since 
CNA's interest cannot exceed the net judgment, its interest is reduced to the 
amount of the net judgment. R. 166. The carrier's proportionate share of fees 
and expenses, as its interest appears, is the following simple mathematical 
calculation: 
attorneys' fees and expenses ($134,999) x carrier's proportional share (100%) 
= carrier's proportional share of attorneys' fees & expenses ($134,999) 
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Since the carrier was 100% liable for the attorneys' fees and costs, the entire 
amount of the net judgment, or the $68,507, becomes a "credit" to the heirs 
against the $134,999 attorneys fees and costs the heirs had already paid. 
This result is equitable to the carrier. First of all, even the 
Commission acknowledged the justice of allocating "all attorneys fees and costs 
. . . to Redd Roofing." See Exhibit 1, page 3 of Commission's Order, R. 264. The 
heirs took the entire risk of litigation for the potential of producing a windfall 
reimbursement or offset to the carrier. The carrier did not participate in any of 
the costs or risks of this litigation, but stood to gain everything if a large judgment 
was entered in favor of the heirs. In fact, CNA came very close to actually 
receiving substantial compensation for its lien. As noted in Fact No. 2 above, the 
jury actually awarded $814,228 in damages, but found the employer and Edward 
to be a total of 75% at fault, thus reducing the net judgment to the figure of 
$203,557. However, assuming hypothetically that the jury had not found the 
contributory fault by Redd and Edward, the application of the formula would have 
produced a net offset to the carrier of $18,965. See Example No. 3, attached 
hereto as Exhibit 5. 
The carrier will undoubtedly press the argument that since it receives 
nothing under the actual facts of this case, this somehow proves that the formula 
is faulty. The contrary is true. The carrier receives nothing in this instance 
because of the unusual facts and the vagaries of litigation, to which all litigants are 
subject. The Esquivels surely would have loved to have had the entire $814,228 
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judgment, but the jury saw the facts differently and deducted 75% from the 
judgment. In the last analysis, the jury's action is why CNA gets no 
reimbursement or offset in this case.8 However, CNA had no direct risks in this 
action. One of the indirect "risks" that any lien claimant has is that of a low 
judgment or a no-cause. In the event of a no-cause, CNA would also recover 
nothing. There is a continuum of risk from a no-cause on the low end to a large 
judgment on the high end, which could result in a 100% reimbursement for CNA. 
The closer the verdict gets to a no-cause, i.e., a low judgment, the more chance 
that CNA will actually recover nothing, as in the facts of this case. However, 
those are just the vagaries of litigation and CNA can hardly complain about the 
result when it shared none of the costs or risks of taking this matter to trial. 
Application of the formula in this case was imminently fair, albeit a 
bit unusual. This is not a hard case, and it makes good law. 
E. Past "Sins" Revisited: Prior Formulas are Distinguishable. 
Two questions need to be answered in this section: a) why don't past 
Supreme Court cases apply the formula suggested by appellants? and b) what is 
wrong with the common practice of simply deducting 1/3 of the carrier's lien as 
the its proportionate share? There are good answers to both of these questions. 
Because of the findings of 50% and 25% comparative negligence respectively against 
Redd and Edward, the provisions of § 34A-2-106(5)(b)(i) and (ii) are triggered, which would 
affect the analysis in this case somewhat. Since the employer is obviously immune from suit, 
and had more than 40% fault, under Subsection (ii), CNA's reimbursement and offset would 
be reduced by 50% due to Redd's immunity, plus another 25% due to Edward's immunity. 
However, this reallocation was unnecessary since CNA bore 100% of the responsibility for 
attorneys' fees and costs in any event. See the ALJ's discussion of this issue at R. 165-66. 
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First, there is no indication that the analysis presented in this Brief 
was ever presented to the Court. An appellate court should only be expected to 
respond to the case that the attorneys bring it, and to address specific requests for 
relief in the case. It is not fair to expect appellate courts to undertake 
independent, searching analysis which the parties have not first made. 
Accordingly, any "inconsistent" formulas in prior decisions are confined to their 
facts and not binding upon this Court. 
Worthen illustrates why the application of the formulas in these cases 
is limited. The injured employee received approximately $10,600 in worker's 
compensation benefits. The underlying personal injury case settled for $60,000 
on a 25% contingent fee. The injured person asked the State Insurance Fund to 
bear its "share, i.e., one-fourth of its $10,667.44 reimbursement, for the benefit 
of plaintiffs attorney for making such recovery." Worthen, 426 P.2d at 224. In 
other words, the attorneys were suggesting the formula of a 25% reduction of the 
carrier's claim because of the 25% contingent attorneys' fee. There is no analysis 
of the basis for a one-fourth deduction of the carrier's lien, other than the obvious 
relation to the contingent fee. The Court gave the injured person what he asked 
for, a 1/4 credit on the lien Therefore, the Worthen formula is limited to the facts 
of the case, since the court merely did what was asked. 
The same thing happened in Prettyman v. Utah State Dept. of Finance, 
supra. This was a wrongful death case which settled for $65,000 on a one-third 
contingent fee. The carrier had apparently paid $6,000 in past benefits and owed 
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another $19,000 in future benefits. Id. at 90. The carrier offered to pay one-third 
of the $6,000 reimbursement, but refused to pay any part of the fees and costs of 
the future monies owed. Id. The attorneys were only requesting that the court 
order the carrier to "pay one-third ($6,415) of the $19,225 that it was required 
to pay by the Industrial Commission award . . . " Id. The court did what the 
applicant requested and ordered the carrier to pay its "pro-rata share" of the 
$19,000 award. Id. at 91. 
The traditional way of assessing the carrier attorneys' fees and costs 
is to simply deduct one-third of the carrier's lien as a "fee" and credit that to the 
injured person. The ALJ commented on this formula as follows: 
With regard to the practice of the parties being charged a set 
percentage or fraction of the fee at the conclusion of the trial, it is not 
in accordance with the statute which requires the parties to 
contribute or be given credit for fees and costs according to their 
monetary interest in the case. 
R. 167. In Example No. 1 above, with a $90,000 carrier lien, the traditional 
approach leaves the carrier with a reimbursement or offset of $60,000 after 
deducting a one-third "fee," or $30,000, as if the injured person's attorney had 
also represented the carrier's interest. This approach, though common, totally 
ignores the statute's requirement that the carrier's contributions to the fees and 
costs be based upon its proportionate "interest." This means "their monetary 
interest in the case." R. 167, 168. In other words, a flat percentage reduction of 
the carrier's lien has nothing to do with the carrier's proportional monetary 
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interest in the case (i.e., net judgment), which proportional interest will vary, 
depending upon the net judgment. As noted by the ALJ: 
It was evidently the intent of the legislature to require the party 
obligated to pay workers' compensation to contribute the proportion 
of the share of fees and costs representing the proportion of the 
monetary interest that party has in the outcome of the case. 
(emphasis added) 
R. 168. Obviously, simply deducting one-third of the carrier's lien as a 
contribution to the carrier's share of attorneys' fees and costs is arbitrary and 
unrelated to the carrier's actual monetary interest in the net judgment. 
The main problem with the traditional "deduct one-third of the lien" 
approach is that it is unfair to the injured person. This can easily be seen in 
Example No. 1 above. The traditional approach leaves the carrier with a $60,000 
claim to be reimbursed or offset against future benefits; however, the correct 
reimbursement for the carrier, based upon the carrier's actual monetary interest 
in the case, would be $38,400. This results in a $22,000 windfall to the carrier. 
F. The Breen Case from Nevada Supports Appellants. 
The case of Breen v. Caesar's Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1986) 
addresses the identical issue faced by the Court in this case. It adopted a formula 
identical to the one suggested by Esquivels. 
Breen was a banquet chef at Caesar's Palace when a stove exploded, 
causing severe, non-fatal bums. He was admitted to the hospital, where he died 
two days later. A malpractice action was filed against the treating physicians, 
alleging that Breen's death was due to over-hydration. The employer's lien, 
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though subject to some dispute in the case, was assumed to be $650,000 due 
primarily to future pension benefits. Id. at 1071. Caesar's claimed its lien should 
apply to the "total proceeds of any recovery from" a third party. Id. at 1072. 
However, the court concluded "that Caesar's would be unjustly enriched if it were 
permitted to assess its lien against the total proceeds of the settlement without 
bearing its share of litigation expenses." Id. at 1074. The court noted that 
Caesar's would thereby have obtained a substantial benefit almost extinguishing 
its obligation, "at appellant's expense." Id. The court then set up the formula for 
determining the proportional shares of the attorneys' fees and costs. Id. 
Caesars share = tQt^1 ajnount of lien 
settlement — (fees & costs) 
Caesar's share = $650.000 = 97.5% 
$1,000,000 — $333,000 
The Breen denominator (settlement — fees and costs) is, of course, the net 
settlement, i.e., $666,666. Id. That denominator is used to figure the appellant's 
share also. Id. The court then multiplied the 97.5 percent carrier's share times 
the litigation expenses, or $333,333, providing a net figure of the attorneys' fees 
for which Caesar's was responsible of $325,000. Id. 
A few years later, Breen was not only upheld but strongly endorsed in 
Nevada Bell v. Hum, 774 P.2d 1002 (Nev. 1989). In Hum, two personal injury 
claims settled for a total of $80,000. Id. at 1002. Total litigation expenses were 
$27,658. Id. The district court apportioned the litigation expenses based upon 
the net judgment, but Nevada Bell argued that the apportionment should proceed 
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based upon the gross settlement. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected the 
employer's arguments, upheld Breen, and validated using the net recovery as the 
denominator: 
This court then determined [in Breen] that fundamental fairness 
requires that the insurer pay litigation expenses in the same 
proportion as the insurer's lien recovery bears to the net 
proceeds . . . . The injured employee may expend thousands of dollars 
and recover little or nothing from the tortfeasor. The insurer risks no 
additional expenditures, yet may recover the full amount it has paid 
in benefits. The Breen formula encourages the injured employee to 
seek a recovery for his injuries from the tortfeasor. Use of the 
formulas developed in other jurisdictions could lead to the injured 
employee[,] who risks losing substantial amounts of additional money, 
receiving nothing even though a recovery is obtained. Such a result is 
unfair to the employee and his family. The Breen formula is 
consistent with this court's policy of liberally construing worker's 
compensation statutes to protect employees and their families, 
(emphasis added; citations omitted) 
Hum, 71A P.2d at 1003. The facts in Hum make for a good example: 




| $24,901 • 
• gross settlement 
• one-third contingent attorneys' fees 
• net judgment 
• carrier's lien 
Nevada Bell's share of litigation expenses was calculated as follows: 
$24.901 = 47% x $27,658 = $12,999 (share of expenses) 
$52,342 
It is equitable that the carrier in Hum pay $12,999 of the total attorneys' fees, 
almost half, because its interest was almost half of the net settlement. Id. at 1002. 
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G. The Formula is Fair and Will Have Universal Application 
to Future Cases. 
The formula proposed in this Brief is absolutely fair for one main 
reason: it bases the proportional allocations of the expenses of the action upon 
the real economic interests in the case, that being the net settlement or judgment. 
You can't divide or apportion what you don't have, or what someone else has. 
The net judgment is the only thing in which the parties share a common interest. 
Therefore, the net settlement has real economic substance, and it only makes 
sense that that would be the basis of apportionment in allocation. With that 
principle fixed, all future calculations of the parties' respective shares of attorneys' 
fees will be fair, constant and easily-determined. 
The beauty of this formula is its simplicity and ease of application. 
One really need only know three easily-determinable numbers in order to apply 
it: the gross settlement (or judgment), the amount of attorneys' fees and costs and 
the carrier's lien. The calculations are purely mathematical and it will be hard to 
make an error. Since the numbers are so easy to determine and the formula is 
easy to follow, it will be self-executing and self-enforcing. The ALJs will love it. 
It will easily and accurately guide the carriers, injured persons and the 
Commission in all their dealings. 
The formula additionally provides an important incentive for the 
injured person to vindicate his/her rights against the third party, thus insuring 
economic justice for both the injured person as well as the industrial insurance 
carrier. CNA's proposal is an absolute disincentive, and will result in far fewer 
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third party actions being brought and therefore, over time, less money in the 
hands of both injured persons and their insurance carriers. With the proposed 
formula firmly in place, the injured person knows that no matter what, assuming 
a successful recovery against a third party, he or she will get something for the 
effort. The injured person and his attorney, contemplating a third party action, 
can anticipate some significant benefit as they scope out a strategy and do an 
informal risk/benefit analysis. Knowing that they won't be "wiped out" by the 
carrier's lien is a major factor in these considerations. 
However, if CNA's position were to prevail, counsel would have to 
inform the client, especially in cases where the lien is substantial, that there is a 
significant chance that the client would get no net benefit from the third party 
action. As the effect of the CNA formula becomes known, many injured persons 
will simply say, "What's the use if the insurance carrier gets it all anyway." 
Adopting the formula proposed by the Esquivels in this case would 
end decades of confusion and injustice in this area of the law. It would enshrine 
equity as the principle which guides allocation of attorneys' fees in third party 
actions. The court should adopt the formula. 
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POINT III 
The Unfair "Discount" 
THE COMMISSION'S REDUCTION OF FUTURE BENEFITS 
TO PRESENT VALUE, USING AN EIGHT PERCENT 
DISCOUNT RATE, IS CONTRARY TO THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE RULE BECAUSE PAYMENT OF A THIRD PARTY 
JUDGMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LUMP SUM 
PAYMENT BY A CARRIER. IT IS OPPRESSIVE TO THE 
WIDOW AND CHILDREN BECAUSE IT ALLOWS A 122% 
OFFSET OF FUTURE BENEFITS. 
A. Plaintiffs' Recovery Is Neither a Lump-Sum Amount Nor 
a Sum Paid By a Carrier Earlier Than Normal. 
Utah Admin. Code R612-1-4 reads: 
Eight percent shall be used for any discounting or present value 
calculations. Lump sums ordered by the Commission of any permanent 
partial benefit award . . . or of any other sum being paid earlier than 
normally paid under a weekly benefit method shall be subject to the 
8% discounting, (emphasis added) 
The Commission erred when it relied on this Rule to enlarge the carrier's offset, 
stating: "Pursuant to the Utah Labor Commission Rule R612-1-4, Redd Roofing 
may determine the extent of its offset by using an 8% discount rate to [sic] 
computing the present value of its future liability." R. 264. However, the Rule 
specifies very limited instances where a present value discount is appropriate: (1) 
where there is a lump-sum settlement ordered by the Commission or (2) where a 
sum is paid by the carrier earlier than the sum would normally be paid. 
R612-1-4. None of these conditions exist, so the Rule is not activated. 
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This is not a "lump-sum" and it was not "ordered by the 
Commission." To qualify as such a "lump-sum," stringent statutory requirements 
must be met: "An administrative law judge, under special circumstances and when 
the same is deemed advisable, may commute periodic benefits to one or more lump-
sum payments." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421. The judgment cannot, therefore, 
be a "lump sum" because there was no finding by the ALJ of "special 
circumstances," and no commuting of "periodic benefits." Further, the 
Commission did not "order" the payment, and it did not come from the carrier; 
it came from a judgment creditor, with no assistance from the carrier. CNA, in 
fact, discontinued its payments to Esquivels on or about April 1, 1996. R. 161. 
Consequently, any attempt to classify a third party judgment as a "lump-sum" will 
be ineffectual in invoking provisions of the Rule. 
CNA's argument is not supported by strained reference to "basic 
principles of accounting." R. 180. Defendants' theory, that plaintiffs will take the 
discounted "lump sum" and invest it at prevailing rates of interest so that the end 
result will be the same as if the money was never discounted in the first place 
(R. 182), flies in the face of well-established case law, as well as common sense. 
See Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 193 P. 24 (Utah 1920). Injured 
employees and their dependents should not be deemed to know and engage in 
sophisticated economic conduct. 
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B. Neither § 34A-2-106(5) nor Case Law Provide for a 
Present Value Computation, 
Nowhere in the governing statute, § 34A-2-106(5), does it state that 
a present value discount may be made in apportioning the proceeds of a plaintiffs 
third party judgment. To the contrary, the statute unequivocally states that the 
recovery "shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5) (a) through (c)" 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5). Surely, if such a carrier discount were 
contemplated, it would be referenced here. Further, there is no case support for 
discounting the carrier's future obligation to plaintiffs. 
C. The Proposed Discount Further Allows the Carrier to 
Escape Paying Its Proportionate Share of Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs. 
Allowing CNA to depreciate its future obligation by the 8% discount 
gives the carrier a $15,000 windfall, for which it pays nothing in attorneys' fees 
and costs. This further circumvents the statutory provisions of § 34A-2-106(5), 
for the reasons explained in Point II. 
The insurer's interest, first determined in § 106(5)(a) to be $68,507 
(the net judgment), is now modified and illogically increased to $83,000, in 
violation of the clear language of § 34A-2-106(5). R. 264-5. 
Statutory analysis under § 34A-2-106(5) is seriously compromised by 
the addition of an unwarranted future value deduction. Discounting for present 
value not only muddies the waters, but circumvents provisions of the statute 
which require that the parties' interests and proportionate share of attorneys' fees 
and costs be determined and apportioned. 
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D. Oppressive to the Poor, the Injured, and Widows and 
Children. 
This present value calculation is an outrageous assault upon the 
defenseless, particularly in death cases. Death cases involve huge amounts of 
future benefits to be paid. The Appeals Board decision means that every third 
party recovery in a death case will result in a substantial additional reduction of 
future benefits, reduced to present value, to benefit the carrier. This money comes 
right out of the hands of the worker's widow and children, and tends to further 
impoverish those already rendered poor by the loss of their husband and father. 
It would be lamentable for this Court to enshrine such an unfair, oppressive rule. 
CONCLUSION 
In Utah and the overwhelming majority of other states, insurance 
carriers must pay their fair share of attorneys' fees and costs necessary to produce 
a third party judgment. The Commission erred when it ruled that CNA was not 
required to contribute to the expense of securing the judgment. 
The calculation of the interests of the carrier and the injured person, 
and the proportionate allocation of attorneys' fees between these interests, 
involves first determining the net judgment (or settlement). The net judgment is 
determined by subtracting the expense of the action (attorneys' fees and costs) 
from the gross judgment. The net judgment is the only realistic economic interest 
from which to allocate the expenses of the action, since it is the only amount in 
which both the injured party and the carrier share a common interest. 
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The formula proposed by the Esquivels in this case for determining 
attorneys' fees and costs is firmly grounded on the governing statute and case law. 
It is also logical, understandable and easy to apply in all situations. It is equitable 
to the carrier and the injured party, and will never result in the carrier getting a 
windfall by receiving 100% reimbursement or offset while contributing nothing 
to the cost of obtaining the third-party judgment. 
Under the unique facts of the Esquivel case, because of the high 
amount of attorneys' fees and costs, the fairly low judgment, and the high amount 
of the future obligations owed by the carrier, there is no carrier reimbursement or 
offset. The Commission erred by finding a first priority reimbursement to the 
carrier, where the first priority is actually determining and deducting the carrier's 
proportionate share of the attorneys' fees and costs. 
The Commission's reduction of the future obligation to present value 
finds no support in the applicable statute, administrative rule, or in case law. It 
is contrary to the intent of the statute. It would result in an oppressive and 
inequitable deduction against the widows and children of deceased workers. 
Dated this 18th day of May, 1998. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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REDD ROOFING & COMPANY and 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Redd Roofing & Company and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, CNA Insurance 
Company (referred to collectively as "Redd Roofing" hereafter) ask the Appeals Board of the Utah 
Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Redd Roofing is not 
entitled to any offset of its liability for benefits payable to the dependents of Edward Esquivel under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act".) 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
May the proceeds of the Esquivel dependents' third party lawsuit be offset against Redd 
Roofing's liability for future dependents' benefits? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On April 26, 1993, Mr. Esquivel was killed in an accident while working for Redd Roofing. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Esquivel was using a roof sweeper manufactured by Gravely 
International to clean the roof of a building owned by the Freeport Center. Redd Roofing accepted 
liability for the dependents' benefits payable under the Act to Mr. Esquivel's children and spouse. 
The dependents then commenced a negligence lawsuit against Gravely International.1 
1
 Prior to their lawsuit against Graveley International, the dependents also brought a 
negligence lawsuit against the Freeport Center. The parties have previously agreed to the 
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On April 9, 1996, the dependents were awarded damages of $203,507.25 from Gravely 
International. After deduction of attorneys fees and costs of $134,999.28, the dependents' net award 
was $68,507.97. 
Although Redd Roofing has waived its claim to reimbursement for dependents' benefits paid 
prior to April 9, 1996, it continues to assert its right to offset the net amount of the dependent's third 
party award against its liability for future dependents' benefits. As of April 9, 1996, the present value 
of Redd Roofing's liability for such future benefits, computed at a discount rate of 8%, was $83,000. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Redd Roofing's right of offset against proceeds of the dependents' third party lawsuit is 
governed by §34A-2-106(5) of the Act.2 Section 106(5)(a) provides the method for allocating the 
costs and attorneys fees of the third party lawsuit between the dependents and Redd Roofing. 
Section 106(5)(b) also establishes the formula for reimbursing Redd Roofing for dependents' benefits 
already paid to the dependents. However, Redd Roofing has waived this right to reimbursement. 
Finally, §106(5)(c) governs Redd Roofing's right to offset the dependents' third party award against 
the future dependents' benefits that Red Roofing would otherwise be required to pay. 
2
 The full text of subsection 34A-2-106(5) is as follows: 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be disbursed in accordance with 
Subsections (5)(a) through (c). 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer 
or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the case of death, by 
the dependents, for any recovery had against the third party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys1 fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows: 
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or employee 
of the employer in the action against the third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to 
persons immune from suit is determined to be less than 40% prior to any reallocation of fault under 
Subsection 78-27-39(2); or 
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the third party if the 
combined percentage of fault attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be 40% or 
more prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death, 
to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable 
for compensation. 
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I. ALLOCATION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
Section 106(5)(a) requires that attorneys fees and costs incurred in third party lawsuits be 
allocated between the dependents and the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier "as 
their interests may appear." In this regard, it is important to note that §106(5)(b) and (c) grant the 
first right of reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier. Because the statute requires that the 
employer's interest in the third party award takes precedence over the claimants' interest, Redd 
Roofing's share must be determined first. The dependents' share will then be limited to the amount 
of the award that remains after Redd Roofing's share has been deducted. The allocation of attorneys' 
fees and costs between the parties must reflect the foregoing division. 
In this case, the amount of the third party judgment actually available for allocation is 
$68,507.97, which represents the amount of the third party judgment after attorneys fees and costs 
have been deducted. The present value of Redd Roofing's liability for future dependents' benefits, 
to be offset by the third party award, is $83,000. Because Redd Roofing's interest in the award is 
more than the net amount of the award itself, Redd Roofing holds the entire interest in the award. 
Consequently, all attorneys fees and costs must be allocated to Redd Roofing. 
II. OFFSET AGAINST FUTURE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
Because Redd Roofing has waived any right to reimbursement under §106(5)(b) for 
dependents' benefits already paid, Redd Roofing's only remaining claim is for use of the third party 
award to offset Redd Roofing's future liability for dependents' benefits. This claim to offset is based 
on§106(5)(c): 
The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of 
death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing 
against the person liable for compensation. 
Under the facts of this case, the plain language of §106(5)(c) requires that the balance of the 
dependent's third party award "be applied to reduce" Redd Roofing's liability for dependents' benefits 
"thereafter accruing". In this case, Redd Roofing's future liability consists of weekly payments of 
$205 to the dependents through the year 2008, at least. Consequently, Redd Roofing is entitled to 
use the third party award to offset its obligation to make weekly payments to the dependents, until 
such time as the award has been exhausted. Pursuant to the Utah Labor Commission's Rule R612-1-
4, Redd Roofing may determine the extent of its offset by using an 8% discount rate to computing 
the present value of its future liability. 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board reverses the decision of the ALT in this matter and grants Redd Roofing's 
motion for review. The Appeals Board hereby concludes that Redd Roofing may offset the sum of 
$68, 507.97, which is the net amount recovered by the dependents of Mr. Esquivel in their lawsuit 
against Gravely International, against Redd Roofing's future liability for workers' compensation 
benefits otherwise payable to the dependents. After the amount of $68,507.97 has been fUlly offset 
against such future benefits, Redd Roofing must then resume payment of the periodic survivors' 
benefits otherwise provided by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. It is so ordered. 
Dated this W day of January, 1998. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MATTING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review in the matter of 
Dependants of Edward Esquivel, Case No.96-0670 was mailed first class postage prepaid this 
/ r d a y of January, 1998, to the following: 
EDWARD ESQUIVEL, deceased 
(Dependants of) 
2631 F AVENUE 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY 
4500 CHERRYCREEK DR SOUTH STE 100 
P O BOX 17369 TERMINAL ANNEX 
DENVER COLORADO 80217-0369 
ROBERT B.SYKES 
JAMES D. VILOS 
MATTHEW H. RATY 
SYKES & VILOS, P.C. 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET #240 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
4 TRIAD CENTER SUITE 500 
POST OFFICE BOX 2970 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-297-
REDD ROOFING COMPANY 
P O BOX 1304 
OGDEN, UTAH 84402 
RICHARD K. NEBEKER 
2040 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
36 SOUTH STATE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Sara Jensc 
Support Specialist 
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FINDINGS OP FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BEFORE: The Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, Presiding Law 
Judge. 
On July 10, 1996, the dependents of Edward Esquivel filed an 
Application for Hearing contending that respondents had discontin-
ued workers compensation payments on or about April 1, 1996, and 
that no payments have been made since that time. The payments were 
to have been $205 per week. 
Briefly, the decedent, Edward Esquivel, sustained a fatal 
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment with respondent employer on April 26, 1993, at the 
Freeport Center in Clearfield, Utah when he fell off one roof and 
fell through another roof to his death. The Application stated 
that this case involved legal issues only, and that no medical 
issues were involved. The respondents agree. 
At the time of his death, Mr. Esquivel was earning $14.00 per 
hour and was working 4 0 hours per week. He was married under the 
common law and had four dependent children under the age of 18 at 
the time of his injury, plus a dependent mother. A Compromise 
Settlement of a Disputed Claim was entered into by the dependents 
of the deceased, and Redd Roofing and CNA Insurance Companies on 
March 2, 1994. The Agreement was approved by a administrative law 
judge (law judge) of the Industrial Commission of Utah on March 7, 
1994. The Compromise Settlement of Disputed Claim Order provided 
that: 
1) . . . The applicant shall pay defendants [hereafter 
respondents] the lump sum of $8,2 63.84. This sum represents 
payment in full of any lien or subrogation owing to CNA for 
death and dependency benefits paid thus far. Respondents 
acknowledge that there is no further claim for offsets, re-
payment, subrogation or the like, on any amounts paid for 




2) The decedent's weekly compensation shall hereafter be $205 
per week. This figure is determined by multiplying the 
maximum compensation rate at the time of the accident ($341) 
by sixty percent. This shall be the weekly compensation rate 
for determining all future benefits to which the surviving 
applicants may be entitled. 
3) The [respondents] shall pay all dependency benefits to the 
surviving applicant pursuant to the Utah Code and applicable 
Rules of the Industrial Commission, at the amount set forth in 
paragraph two above, for as long as the applicants are 
entitled to receive those benefits under the law and rules of 
the Commission. 
4) The compensation awarded hereunder shall be paid as 
follows: 
a) to Norma Esquivel, for herself, one-fifth of the 
amount of the benefits of $205 per week. 
b) to Norma Esquivel, for and on behalf of the four 
dependent children, and to be used for their support, the 
sum of one-fifth of the weekly benefits for each child. 
Norma Esquivel shall use those sums for the support of 
the children. 
c) to Ofelia Herrera, the dependent mother, no sum shall 
be paid from these benefits at present because the 
parties have agreed that Ofelia will take a significant 
share of the third party settlement. 
5) Applicants understand that this is a full and final 
settlement. 
6) Applicants understand that in accepting this settlement, 
they are giving up the right to an administrative hearing at 
the Industrial Commission in which an Administrative Law Judge 
could give the applicants more money, less money, or no money. 
7) Applicants' decision to settle this case is their own. No 
one has placed any pressure on the applicants or have 
influenced the applicants in this decision. 
8) No attorneys' fee is claimed or awarded. 
9) It is the applicants desire that the Administrative Law 





The Order was approved by Theodore Kanell as attorney for Redd 
Roofing and CNA Insurance Company and Robert B. Sykes as attorney 
for the applicants. 
Respondents admit that there are only legal issues to be 
resolved, but deny that the insurance carrier has illegally stopped 
paying benefits due to the personal injury settlement. Specifical-
ly, the insurance carrier alleges that it has stopped making pay-
ments pursuant to the provisions of UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended). 
The respondents assert that the petitioners have recovered 
substantial sums of money from third party tort feasors and the 
respondents state that they are relieved from paying further 
benefits as allowed under UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) until the 
petitioners show that they have utilized the third party tort 
recovery money in paying for benefits that would be otherwise 
receivable under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
By way of a separate and affirmative defense, the respondents 
state that the petitioners previously entered into a settlement 
agreement where the petitioners finalized the settlement with the 
third party tort feasor in 1994. This is the same settlement that 
was previously discussed in this Order. Further, the settlement 
agreement was prepared by petitioners and their attorneys. By the 
express language of the settlement agreement, the settlement 
agreement only settled issues up to that point in time. 
Respondents assert that it was their intent that if the petitioners 
recovered money from any third party tort feasors that the 
petitioners would be bound by UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended). 
In this case, the petitioners filed a lawsuit against a third 
party tort feasor named Gravely International. Petitioners did not 
tell respondents that they had filed. Petitioners claim that the 
omission was inadvertent and certainly unintentional that the 
respondents were not informed. The case went to trial and 
petitioners recovered a gross amount of $203,507.25. Respondents 
claim that they are entitled to reimbursement of their lien for 
payments since the first settlement and are further entitled to be 
relieved of any further responsibility for future benefits pursuant 
to the statute. Respondents ask that the Industrial Commission 
determine how much of an offset shall be granted and make a further 
determination as to when payments should be resumed, if at all. 
UCA §35-1-62 (3)(a) (1953 as amended) states as follows: 
. . . . Before proceeding against the third party, the injured 
employee, or, in case of death, his heirs, shall give written 





person obligated for the compensation payments, to give the 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the 
proceeding. 
The settlement agreement previously discussed was filed 
against another set of defendants, Freeport Center Associates, a 
partnership, and Robert 0'Block and Gordon Olch, partners, 
associated in a business in the common name and stock of such 
company, James F. Hannan and John Does I through X, and was filed 
under Civil Number 930900370 PI in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County. This action was ultimately submitted to 
nonbinding arbitration or mediation by retired Judge Collin Y. 
Christensen. After hearing the evidence for several hours, Judge 
Christensen found that the cause of the accident and the 
petitioner's death were as follows: Freeport Center - 40% 
negligent; Redd Roofing, the employer - 40% negligent and Edward 
Esquivel, the deceased - 20% negligent. The settled amount against 
these defendants was $375,000. The liability of the Freeport 
Center was noted in the settlement agreement to have been 
vigorously contested. Petitioners' basis for liability was the 
claim that Freeport Center, as land owner of the buildings on which 
Redd Roofing, an independent contractor was working, should have 
responsibility for the safety of Redd Roofing's workers. Based on 
the settlement agreement, the parties agreed to compromise and 
settle the matter on a full and final basis as follows: 
a) The petitioners pay respondents the sum of $8,263.84. 
This sum represents payment in full of any lien or subrogation 
owning CNA for death or dependency. Respondents acknowledge 
that there is no further claim for offset, re-payment, 
subrogation or the like on any amounts paid for benefits to 
this point. 
b) The decedent's weekly compensation was noted to be $205 
per week and this was determined to be the weekly compensation 
rate determining all future benefits to which the surviving 
petitioners may be entitled. 
Respondents argue that subsequent or even during the period 
this agreement was being negotiated the petitioners were planning 
to sue Gravely International which was the maker of the machine 
used to clean the roof of the Freeport Center building in question. 
The petitioners deny this and indicate that the arguments show that 
they were merely looking into the possibility of suit against 
Gravely International. 
The petitioners assert that respondents were informed of the 






As evidence for this the petitioners cite to the Compromise 
and Settlement of a Disputed Claim between the same parties in the 
instant hearing and the related Order of Approval which was 
previously discussed. The exhibit which is part of that original 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement shows a disbursement sheet with 
$10,000 withheld as advanced cost for product liability litigation. 
The footnote on that exhibit indicates that there will be an 
investigation into the case and that if there is no reasonable 
basis to pursue the case, the remaining monies will be disbursed to 
the beneficiaries in the same proportions as paid out of the 
settlement monies. Thus it appears that there was a possible third 
party action that could take place and that the respondents were 
informed about it at the time. However, it is also noted that none 
of those representing the petitioners felt that there was any great 
possibility of additional monies being obtained based on a theory 
of product liability. 
The petitioners assert that with regard to any amount received 
from Gravely International, the 1994 settlement agreement, and the 
letter dated March 15, 1994 from Kerry L. Chlarson to Mr. Theodore 
Kanell, attorney for respondents in this case shows that " . . . 
this check, along with a reduced workers7 compensation payment to 
Norma Esquivel, completely and fully satisfies any subrogation your 
client, CNA Insurance Company, may have had against any settlement 
proceeds the Esquivels and Ofelia Herrera may have received from 
the Freeport Center or may receive from any other third party.11 
The federal jury did return a verdict in favor of the 
Esquivels, finding total damages in the amount of $814,029. 
However, the jury found Gravely International 25 percent at fault. 
It apportioned 2 5 percent of the liability for the fall to Edward 
Esquivel and 50 percent to Redd Roofing. Therefore, the Esquivels 
were awarded a gross judgment of only 25 five percent of the total 
damages or $203,507.25. 
With regard to the issues of reimbursement, UCA §3 5-1-62 
(5) (b) (ii) (1993 as amended) provides that the amount reimbursable 
to the person liable for compensation benefits shall be reduced by 
the percentage of fault attributable to "the employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer. . . if the combined percentage 
of fault attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be 
forty percent or more." 




percent. When Mr. Esquivel's fault as an employee is also 
included, that would cause the total fault by which the amount 
reimbursable to the insurance carrier to be reduced to 75 percent. 
Thus, only 25 percent of the total amount the carrier is liable for 
is to be reimbursed to the carrier. UCA §3 5-1-62 (1993 as amended) 
paragraph five requires that, " . . . any recovery obtained against 
a third person be disbursed as follows: (a) the reasonable 
expense of the action, including attorneys fees, shall be paid and 
charged proportionately against the parties as their interest may 
appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a 
credit upon any fee payable to the injured employee or, in the case 
of death, to the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
At paragraph B, the statute says that the person liable for 
compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in subsection 
(5)(a) as follows: 
* * * 
" (ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the 
percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the 
third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to 
persons immune from suit is determined to be forty percent or 
more prior to any allocation of fault under subsection 78-27-
39 (2)." 
Since the employer had 50 percent fault attributed to him this 
paragraph is applicable. CNA has paid $21,320 to the Esquivels in 
workers7 compensation benefits since the Freeport Center dispute 
was resolved until the day of judgment. CNA is required reasonably 
to pay an additional $126,602 in benefits to the Esquivels. CNA is 
responsible to pay future benefits based upon benefits being paid 
until the youngest child reaches her eighteenth birthday. Prettyman 
v. Utah Dept. of Finance, 496 P. 2d 89 (Utah) held that future 
payments are included in calculating the interest of the 
compensation carrier in a settlement or judgment against a third 
party. Including all past, present, and future payments leaves a 
total liability of workers compensation benefits for CNA in the 
amount of $147,922, making the interest of or exposure to CNA in an 
amount of $147,922. 
Gravely International was determined by the Federal Court to 
be 25 percent at fault. Based upon the statute, reducing the 
reimbursement by the percentage of fault attributable to the 
employer and his employees (75%), or others immune from suit, the 





CNA can have no more interest in the judgment received by the 
Esquivels than the amount which CNA would have to pay out in 
medical expenses, burial expenses, and death benefits. This amount 
is $147,922. This is a ceiling on the amount to which CNA has an 
interest. 
CNA has an interest in the recovery or judgment and its 
interest is more accurately stated to be in the net recovery and 
not the gross. In other words, CNA's interest is not in the total 
amount of $203,507.25, but is only in the net judgment which cannot 
be more than $147,922 in any event, and in this case is $203,507.25 
minus attorneys7 fees and costs. An attorneys' interest in the 
judgment is in the fees and costs. CNA's interest is only the 
remaining money after fees and costs have been paid as long as it 
is less than the ceiling noted. CNA has no claim to the fees or 
costs, in fact it has an obligation to contribute to those 
expenses. Gross recovery, minus attorneys fees including costs, 
equals net recovery. 
The gross amount of recovery was $203,507.25. The gross 
amount minus $81,402.90 in attorneys' fees and $53,596.38 in costs 
equals $68,507.97. Therefore, CNA's interest is reduced to 
$68,507.97. This amount is the amount which will be received by 
the Esquivels after all expenses of trial. Certainly, CNA should 
receive no credit for any amount greater than that received by the 
Esquivels. If CNA were to receive credit for a greater amount than 
$68,507.97, CNA would not be paying its proportionate share of the 
expenses as its "interest may appear." With regard to the practice 
of the parties being charged a set percentage or fraction of the 
fee at the conclusion of the trial, it is not in accordance with 
the statute which requires the parties to contribute or be given 
credit for fees and costs according to their monetary interest in 
the case. 
In order to calculate CNA's proportionate share of fees, the 
first item to be considered is CNA's interest. In this case, CNA 
has an interest only in the net recovery since it is less than the 
amount which has and will be paid by CNA. The net recovery amounts 
to $68,507.25 which is the money available for reimbursement. CNA 
is potentially entitled to 100 percent of the available $68,507.25. 
Since CNA has a claim for 100 percent of the net recovery, it must 
pay 100 percent of the attorneys' fees and costs. The amount of 
attorneys' fees and costs is $134,999.28. Since CNA's 
proportionate share of fees and costs is $134,999.28, CNA's lien 
must be reduced by that amount. The lien amount credited to CNA is 
thus zero since the fees and costs were greatly in excess of the 
net amount recovered. CNA is thus not given credit for any offset 






simple, but improper formula used to compute proportionate shares 
of fees and costs. It was evidently the intent of the legislature 
to require the party obligated to pay workers' compensation to con-
tribute the proportion of the share of fees and costs representing 
the proportion of the monetary interest that party has in the 
outcome of the case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Under UCA §35-1-62(5) (1993 as amended) , it is determined that 
CNA's proportionate amount of costs and fees is $134,999.28 and 
CNA's lien must be reduced by that amount. Since the total amount 
of CNA's lien is only $68,507.97, CNA is not entitled to any 
reimbursement from the third party action against Gravely 
International. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Redd Roofing and or CNA Insurance 
shall pay $205 per week, in accordance with the Compromise 
Settlement of a Disputed Claim and Order of Approval dated March 7, 
1994 with interest from April 2, 1996. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received by the Commission in writing within 
thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless so received, this 
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In the 
event a Motion for Review is timely received, the parties shall 
have fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt by the Commission, 
in which to file a written response with the Commission in 
accordance with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Dated this , 1997 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Tab 3 
ROBERT B. SYKES (#3180) 
JAMES D. VILOS (#3333) 
MATTHEW H. RATY (#6635) 
SYKES & VILOS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
311 South State Street, #240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. (801) 533-0222 
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD ESQUIVEL, deceased, 
NORMA ESQUIVEL, RICHARD 
ESQLWEL, ANGEL ESQUIVEL, 
EDICA ESQUIVEL and OFELIA 
HERRERA, 
Petitioners, 
REDD ROOFING & 
CONSTRUCTION CO., and CNA 
COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Appeal No.: 
Priority No. 7 
Petitioners petition the Utah Court of Appeals as follows: 
1. For review of the final agency action taken by the Appeals Board of 
the Utah Labor Commission in the above-entitled matter on January 14, 1998 wherein 
Respondents' Motion for Review was granted and additional off-sets of benefits were 
ordered because of a third-party judgment. 
Exhibit 1. 
2. A copy of the Labor Commission's Order is attached hereto as 
DATED this 13th day of February, 1998. 
SYKES &VILOS 
OBERT B. SYKES, At&tfrey for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION 
FOR REVIEW was hand-delivered, this 13th day of February, 1998, to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Utah Labor Commission 
160 South 300 East, Third Floor 
P. O. Box 146610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq. 
Hanson, Epperson & Wallace 
4 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Q:\WP51\CU ENTUS13\I\WEAI..NOT 
Ms. Norma Esquivel 
2631 "F" Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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Tab 4 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62(5) (1994) 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be disbursed 
as follows: 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in 
the case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the 
third party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, 
less the proportionate share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for 
in Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows: 
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to the employer, 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action 
against the third party if the combined percentage of fault 
attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be less 
than 40% prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 
78-27-39(2); or 
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the 
percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer in the action against the third party 
if the combined percentage of fault attributed to persons 
immune from suit is determined to be 40% or more prior to 
any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation, 
(emphasis added) 
Tab 5 
EXAMPLE NO. 3 
$814,228 - gross settlement/judgment 
- $325,691 - 40% contingent attorneys' fees 
- $ 55r596 - expenses of litigation (costs) 
$454.941 - net judgment (the "denominator") 
I $147,922 - carrier's lien 
Under this hypothetical (assuming that the carrier's interest included both the 
$21,320 it paid, but actually waived in this case, plus the additional $126,602 
owed, for a total carrier interest of $147,922), the following would apply: 
carrier's interest $147r922 = carrier's proportionate = 34% 
net judgment $434,941 share 
attorneys' fees and expenses ($379,287) x carrier's proportional share (34%) 
= carrier's proportional share of attorneys' fees & expenses (^$128.957^ 
This $128,957 in fees and expenses would be a credit to the applicant, and the 
carrier would still receive a substantial reimbursement calculated as follows: 
$147,922 (carrier's interest) 
— $128.957 r carrier's fair share of attorneys fees and costs^ 
$ 18 965 (net reimbursement - offset to carrier) 
In the above hypothetical, one can easily see the justice in requiring a carrier to 
bear 34% of the attorneys' fees and costs, since the carrier's interest is 34% of the 
net judgment. Under the "traditional method" of simply deducting one-third of 
the carrier's lien (see Point II.E.), the carrier would credit the applicant for only 
$49,307 of attorneys' fees (i.e. one third of the lien), instead of the $128,000 
credit it should be, resulting in a nearly $80,000 windfall for the carrier. Even 
more outrageous, however, is the method employed by the Commission. The 
carrier would be reimbursed or have an offset for the entire $147,122! This would 
result in a $128,957 windfall for the carrier (after deducting the correct $18,965 
to which it is entitled), for which it would pay about 12% of its interest while not 
assuming any of the risks of litigation. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF were served upon all parties of record, at the addresses listed below, by 
hand-delivery on this 18th day of May, 1998: 
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq. 
Stephen P. Horvat, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
4 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone No. (801) 363-7611 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
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